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Canada’s Budget Triumph 




A federal government runs a large deficit.  Deficits are so large that the ratio of 
federal debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) approaches 70 percent.  A 
constituency of voters have gotten used to large federal spending programs.  Does 
that sound like the United States?  Well, yes.  But it also describes Canada in 
1993.  Yet, just 16 years later, Canada’s federal debt had fallen from 67 percent to 
only 29 percent of GDP.  Moreover, in every year between 1997 and 2008, 
Canada’s federal government had a budget surplus.  In one fiscal year, 2000–2001, 
its surplus was a whopping 1.8 percent of GDP.  If the U.S. government had such 
a surplus today, that would amount to a cool $263 billion rather than the current 
deficit of more than $1.5 trillion. 
 
We often think of Canada as a more-socialist and higher-tax country than the 
United States, and for good reason: to some extent it’s true.  For instance, Canada 
has a single-payer health care system, no private universities, and a five-percent 
federal tax on goods and services.  So, what happened?  How did the Canadian 
government do it?  You might think that the Canadian government achieved the 
budget surplus by 2000–2001 with major increases in taxes, but it didn’t.  Part of 
the fiscal improvement was due to high economic growth.  But economic growth 
is, in part, a result of policy, not a policy itself. 
 
The main policy actions that the Canadian government took to shrink its budget 
deficit and turn deficits into surpluses were cuts in government spending. 
Moreover, the Canadian government didn’t just cut the growth rate of spending, a 
favorite trick of U.S. politicians who want to claim the mantle of fiscal 
conservatism.  It also cut absolute spending on many programs in dollar terms.  
And because the inflation rate in Canada, though low, was greater than zero over 
the whole time period, these cuts in dollar terms were even larger in inflation-
adjusted dollars. 
 
There are two morals of this story.  First, the Canadian experience shows us that a 
large budget deficit can be turned into a budget surplus with ten years of fiscal 
discipline, mainly with spending cuts.  It can happen here in the United States.  
We do not have to accept the idea that we have only two grim choices: living with 
huge budget deficits and a federal debt that both increase as a percent of GDP, or 
accepting our current spending but reducing the budget deficit with major tax 
increases.    
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The second moral of the story is that the Canadian experience does not support the 
Keynesian view that policymakers should not cut government spending during an 
economic slowdown.  The Canadian experience, just like the U.S. experience 
during the 1920–21 recession and in the first two years following World War II, 
shows that cutting government spending even during low-growth years can be 
good for long-term economic results.   
 
Following is the story of how Canada achieved fiscal discipline, turned a budget 






―Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill.‖  This line from Macbeth  
applies to Canada’s federal government budget.  During the fiscal year 1967–68 
(Canada’s fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31), the last fiscal year before 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau became Prime Minister of Canada in April 1968, spending 
by Canada’s federal government was 17.1 percent of GDP.  Trudeau, who had 
studied at the London School of Economics under Marxist Harold Laski, was, to 
put it mildly, a strong believer in big government.   Trudeau was also a Keynesian, 
believing that the government should run deficits when the economy has less than 
full employment.  Trudeau was Prime Minister of Canada from April 20, 1968 to 
June 30, 1984, with only a lapse of nine months from June 4, 1979 to March 3, 
1980, when Joe Clark of the Progressive Conservative Party was Prime Minister.  
Possibly more than any other person in Canada’s history, Trudeau brought ―big 
government‖ to Canada.  In fiscal year 1984-85, Trudeau’s last year in office, 
government spending had zoomed to 22.9 percent of GDP, an increase of almost 
five percentage points, and the budget deficit was 8.3 percent of GDP (see figure 
1). 
 
For every year of Trudeau’s time in office, except for 1969–70, the federal 
government’s budget was in deficit.  Budget deficits over Trudeau’s fifteen years 
in office averaged 3.6 percent of GDP.  But this average is misleading.  Budget 
deficits steadily worsened while he was Prime Minister, averaging 7.9 percent of 













One main reason for the growth in deficits as a percent of GDP was that interest 
on the debt accounted for a growing portion of federal spending.  By fiscal year 
1984–85, interest on Canada’s federal debt was 5.5 percent of GDP.   
 
Shortly after Trudeau resigned in 1984, Canada held a federal election in which 
Brian Mulroney of the Progressive Conservative Party emerged as prime minister.  
While in office, Mulroney signed a free-trade agreement with the United States 
and also got federal-program spending under control.  During the first fiscal year 
of Mulroney’s time in office, Canada’s federal budget had an operating deficit of 
1.2 percent of GDP; that is, tax revenues were 1.2 percentage points of GDP 
below spending on government programs, not including interest on the debt.  By 
the time he left office in 1993, he had achieved an operating surplus of 0.3 percent 
of GDP.  But between 1985 and 1993, interest rates on 3-month Treasury bills 
averaged 9.0 percent and on 10-year bonds averaged 9.8 percent.  Because these 
substantially exceeded the 5.4 percent growth of nominal GDP, the amount the 
federal government spent on interest on the debt ballooned.  As a result, Mulroney 
failed to reduce Canada’s budget deficit and, through the power of compounding, 
the ratio of federal debt to GDP rose substantially.  Mulroney was Prime Minister 
from September 1984 to June 1993.  For the fiscal years 1985–86 through 1993–
94, the ones over which he had the most control, federal spending as a percent of 
GDP stayed high, averaging 22.6 percent of GDP and never falling below 21.9 
percent.  The federal budget deficit during that time averaged 5.3 percent of GDP 
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(see figure 1).  During Mulroney’s time in office, federal debt rose from 46.9 
percent to 67.0 percent of GDP.   
 
Because of the rising federal debt, something had to change.  Surprisingly, the two 
agents of that change were from the same political party that had caused most of 
the fiscal damage: the Liberal Party.  One of them had done some of the damage; 
the other was the son of a politician who had done even more of the damage.  
These two agents of change were Jean Chretien, the Prime Minister from 1993 to 
2003, and Paul Martin, Jr., Chretien’s Minister of Finance from 1993 to 2002.  
(The Minister of Finance in Canada is the equivalent of the Secretary of the 
Treasury in the United States, except that he is also an elected Member of 
Parliament, unlike the U.S. Treasury Secretary, who is appointed.) Chretien was 
an extremely unlikely agent of change.  He had been in the Cabinet of every 
Liberal government since 1967 and was regarded as the political heir of Pierre 
Trudeau.  His main political rival was Paul Martin, Jr.  Paul Martin Jr.’s father, 
Paul Martin, Sr., had been a cabinet minister in four Liberal governments and was 
one of the most left-wing members of the Liberal cabinet. He had been Minister of 
National Health and Welfare from 1946 to 1957.  In 1957, in that role, Martin 
helped implement nationalized insurance for hospital coverage, officially named 
―Hospitalization.‖1  Later, the Trudeau government implemented a single-payer 
plan for hospital and doctor care, a plan still known today as Medicare.  Because 
of Martin Sr.’s early role in the struggle for federal control, he is sometimes 
referred to as ―the father of Medicare.‖  
 
 
The 1993 Election 
 
In February 1993, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney—his approval rating having 
fallen into the teens—announced his resignation.  In Canada, when the prime 
minister resigns, the party holds a leadership contest.  Kim Campbell won that 
contest and became Canada’s first, and still its only, female prime minister.  Under 
Canadian election law, the party in power must call an election within five years 
of the previous one, and so Campbell called an election for September 1993.  
Although the Progressive Conservative Party’s poll numbers started to improve, 
her party was hampered by two big economic negatives.  The first was the seven-
percent federal Goods and Services Tax (GST) that Mulroney had initiated in 
1991.  The tax had replaced a narrow, hidden 13.5-percent tax on manufacturing.   
The GST was set to be revenue-neutral or even revenue-losing for the federal 
government, but that didn’t matter to many voters: The 13.5-percent tax that was 
about to disappear was one that few voters knew about, whereas everyone was 
keenly aware of the highly visible 7 percent GST.  
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The second negative for the Progressive Conservative Party was that Canada’s 
economy was in the doldrums.  The unemployment rate for 1993 averaged a 
whopping 11.4 percent, and Canada’s growth rate of GDP had been –2.1 percent 
in 1991, an anemic 0.9 percent in 1992, and a below-average 2.3 percent in 1993.   
 
For those reasons and because of some key errors in campaigning, Canada’s 
Progressive Conservative Party went down to a crushing defeat in the September 
1993 election. The Progressive Conservative Party, which had held 151 seats of 
the 295-seat Parliament, was reduced to only two seats, a 99-percent reduction.  In 
fact, the defeat was so great that the Progressive Conservative Party, in 2003, 
merged with another party, the Canadian Alliance, to become, simply, the 
Conservative Party. 
 
The Liberal Party under Jean Chretien took over the reins.  But it wasn’t business 
as usual for Chretien.  In fact, in a daring move that presaged the Republican 
Party’s ―Contract with America‖ during the 1994 Congressional elections, the 
Liberal Party published the Red Book—so called because of its red cover—which 
laid out in some detail a set of promises.  Arguably the most important of these 
was the Liberal Party’s promise to reduce the budget deficit.  As we shall see, the 




On February 22, 1994, Minister of Finance Paul Martin rose in the House of 
Commons to move that the House approve the budget for the next two fiscal years.  
Once the House of Commons passes the budget, Canada’s Senate, which, by 
tradition, has very little power, typically rubber-stamps the budget.  Here are some 
excerpts from Martin’s budget speech. 
 
This budget sets in motion the most comprehensive reform of 
government policy in decades. We are putting in place an agenda for 
innovation in the new economy. We are responding to the needs of 
small business. We are launching a strategy through which 
government knows both when it can lend a helping hand and, as 
important, when it should stand aside. 
We are undertaking a major effort to build a responsible social 
security system that is fair, compassionate and affordable, and that 
means making fundamental changes to our unemployment insurance 
system. It means overhauling the structure of federal-provincial 
transfers for social programs. It means doing so in a co-operative 
way with predictability built in, setting aside the old tactics of stealth 
and surprise. 
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The cold war is over. This budget sets out immediate actions attuned 
to the 1990s, actions that will be followed by a comprehensive 
review of Canada’s defence policy. 
To succeed we must get monetary and fiscal policy right. We have 
done the first. We are a low-inflation country. We will stay that way. 
We are and we will remain a low-inflation country. 
It is now time for government to get its fiscal house in order. For 
years governments have been promising more than they can deliver 
and delivering more than they can afford. That has to end and we are 
ending it. 
The actions taken in this budget will reduce the deficit from $45.7 
billion this year to $39.7 billion in 1994–95 and $32.72 billion the 
year after. 
This is a two-stage budget. Therefore, detailed fiscal projections are 
presented to 1995–96 only. However, in terms of deficit reduction 
we are not waiting for the second stage. The decisions taken today 
by themselves set us on a clear path to achieving the government's 
deficit target of three percent of GDP in three years. 
We will achieve this by using reasonable economic assumptions, not 
rosy forecasts. We believe that it is more important to meet a target 
than to declare an illusion and then fall short. 
Canadians have told us that they want the deficit brought down by 
reducing government spending, not by raising taxes, and we agree. 
The era of tax and spend government is gone. 
Over the course of the next three years, for every $1 raised in new 




The speech also specified particular budget cuts that included: 
 
(1) a reduction in unemployment insurance  benefits brought about by reducing the 
duration of benefits, increasing the amount of time people needed to be employed 
to qualify for the benefits, and reducing the benefit for most recipients to a 
maximum of 55 percent of previous pay; 
 
(2) a substantial reduction in the operating budgets of various federal departments; 
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(3) cancellation of the EH-101 helicopter program for the Department of Defence 
and additional cuts in defense spending totaling $1.9 billion over the next years; 
and 
 
(4) cuts in subsidies for businesses. 
 
The rest of the speech specified some small tax increases and, as in U.S. 
presidents’ State of the Union speeches, a laundry list of promises for more 
spending.  What’s striking, though, is that the promised increases in spending were 
much less than the promised cuts. 
 
The Education Campaign 
 
Before this speech, Martin had shifted away from the usual pattern of budget 
consultations.  Previously, governments had consulted with the various interest 
groups one by one, each presenting its wish list.  But Martin changed the dynamics 
by having four regional consultations in which various interest groups, experts, 
and citizens met together and contested with each other.
4
   
 
Martin also undertook a campaign to educate the public about what was needed to 
turn Canada’s budget around.  In October 1994, his Department of Finance 
published an 87-page report, A New Framework for Economic Policy,
5
 which 
contained two highlights.  The big-picture highlight was its clear exposition of the 
fiscal arithmetic.  Given the size of the debt, and given that, at the time, the 
interest rate on the debt exceeded the growth rate of GDP, the government had to 
run a substantial surplus on its program budget (that is, have tax revenues exceed 
expenditures on government programs) in order to reduce the ratio of debt to GDP.  
A numerical example similar to the one the Department of Finance used will help 
clarify. 
 
At the time—remember that this was 1994—the average interest rate on the 
federal debt was about 8 percent.  The growth rate of nominal GDP was about 4.5 
percent.  The ratio of federal debt to GDP was approaching 75 percent.  That 
meant that in a given year, the government was spending eight percent of 75 
percent of GDP, which is 6 percent of GDP, just for interest on the debt.  So, 
simply cutting back spending on programs to equal revenue would leave a deficit 
of six percent of GDP.  With GDP rising by only 4.5 percent, the debt/GDP ratio 
would rise.  How could the government prevent this ratio from rising?  You might 
think that the answer was to have the deficit equal ―only‖ 4.5 percent of GDP.  But 
remember that the interest rate on this new addition to the debt would be eight 
percent, which means that the debt/GDP ratio would still rise.  The only way to 
keep the debt/GDP ratio from rising, it turns out, was to get the deficit down to 




So, why did Paul Martin choose a deficit goal of 3 percent rather than 2.625 
percent?  Most likely because, as Martin’s boss, Prime Minister Chretien, pointed 
out,
6
 the rule for European countries entering the European Union was that their 




The other notable item in Martin’s speech was his promise to reform the 
unemployment insurance program.  Under the Unemployment Insurance Act of 
1971, a Canadian could receive unemployment insurance (UI) benefits for a 
maximum of 50 weeks if he lived in a high-unemployment area and had been 
employed for enough weeks.  (The maximum benefit period in the United States 
during normal times is a much-lower 26 weeks.)  In Canada, someone could 
qualify for UI by having been employed for only eight weeks.  And if this person 
lived in one of regions of the country with a high unemployment rate, he could, 
after working for eight weeks, receive 42 weeks of benefits.  This was particularly 
a problem in regions with seasonal industries such as fishing.
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  Workers would 
fish for a couple of months and then get ―on the pogey‖ (the Canadian term for 
being on UI) for the rest of the year.   
 
Under some minor reforms made in 1977, someone had to be unemployed for 10 
to 14 weeks (the lower number applied to those living in regions of the country 
with higher unemployment rates) before getting UI benefits.  In 1994, Martin 
raised the threshold a little, making the range 12 to 20 weeks.  
 
In the U.S. political system, when it comes to domestic economic policy, the 
President proposes and Congress disposes.  But in Canada’s parliamentary system, 
the legislative and executive branches are the same.  Therefore, as long as the 
government has a majority of the seats in the House of Commons, the budget 
proposals it makes will pass.  Thus, Martin’s budget proposals were implemented. 
 
Martin’s Department of Finance also ―sold‖ the budget changes to Canadians with 
the aforementioned New Framework.  One of the issues highlighted in this 
document was the disincentives caused by the UI system.  For example, the 
authors wrote: 
 
The rules of the program have encouraged chronic, repeat use.  For 
example, almost 40 percent of people receiving UI in 1993 had 
claimed benefits at least three times during the past five years and 
the number of frequent repeaters has been rising.  The average 
duration of spells on UI has also increased steadily.  Moreover, the 
attractiveness of the program has induced people to enter the labor 
force in order to qualify.  Studies estimate that these factors have 
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combined to raise the unemployment rate in Canada by 1 to 2 
percentage points (p. 52). 
 
Or, as Obama economic advisor Lawrence Summers put it in The Concise 
Encyclopedia of Economics: 
 
The second way government assistance programs contribute to long-
term unemployment is by providing an incentive, and the means, not 
to work.  Each unemployed person has a ―reservation wage‖—the 
minimum wage he or she insists on getting before accepting a job. 
Unemployment insurance and other social assistance programs 





Martin seemed to have prepared the public so well that many were disappointed 
that he didn’t cut government spending more.  According to Canadian economist 
Thomas J. Courchene: 
 
Canadians were deeply disappointed with the budget:  they were 
ready for much more in the way of meaningful fiscal belt-tightening 
and Paul Martin had let them down.  He would not make that 
mistake again.  The politics of stiffening the budget stance were 
made much easier (than was the case for the Mulroney Tories, for 
example) because the principal opposition to the governing Liberals 




One of Martin’s main problems in getting the budget under control was getting his 
colleagues who were ministers of the other departments under control.  So the 
education campaign that he undertook with them was similar to the one with the 
public.  Also, Martin formed a program-review committee to which a Cabinet 
minister had to appeal if he objected to cuts.  But the ground rule was zero-sum: 
that is, if a Cabinet minister wanted a smaller cut in one program, he had to come 
up with a bigger cut in another program.
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  As Martin wrote in his memoirs, ―[I]f a 
minister did not identify the cuts necessary to reach the target, the committee 
would do it for him.‖  Two factors strengthened both Martin’s resolve and his 
power within the Cabinet.  First was a pair of articles in the Wall Street Journal on 
January 11 and 12, 1995.  The January 11 article referred to the Canadian dollar as 
the ―northern peso.‖  At the time, the Canadian dollar was worth a measly 71 
cents.  This was a currency that had been worth a few percent more than the U.S. 
dollar for much of the 1950s and only about eight cents less than the U.S. dollar 
for most of the 1960s.  The January 12 article referred to Canada as ―an honorary 
member of the Third World.‖ 
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The second factor that strengthened Martin’s hand was that two weeks before he 
introduced the February 27, 1995 budget for the next fiscal year, Moody’s 
Investors Service put the Canadian government on a ―credit watch‖ because of 
Canada’s high debt/GDP ratio.  
 
The 1995 Budget 
 
Martin came out swinging.  The budget cuts he laid out in the 1995-96 budget 
were more aggressive than in the previous budget.  Here are some excerpts:  
 
We have said from the beginning that we would meet our targets come 
what may. Therefore, those gaps must be closed. With this budget, we are 
closing them. 
We will hit our deficit target for 1995–96. We will hit our target for 1996-
97. And of equal importance, the downward track established by the 
actions taken in this budget will continue in the years thereafter. 
 
Taking the next two fiscal years together, this budget delivers cumulative 
savings of $15.6 billion, with spending cuts accounting for $13.4 
billion, more than 85 per cent of the total. 
 
Going beyond, to 1997-98, the reforms we are introducing today will 
continue to pay-off, with further savings totalling $13.3 billion, of 
which spending reductions amount to $11.9 billion. 
 
That means that over the next three fiscal years, this budget will deliver 
cumulative savings of $29 billion, of which $25.3 billion are 
expenditure cuts. This is by far the largest set of actions in any 
Canadian budget since demobilisation after the Second World War. 
 
Over the next three years, the actions in this budget deliver almost seven 
dollars of spending cuts for every one dollar of new tax revenue. 
 
These measures will have a very significant impact on the level of 
government spending in the future. 
By 1996–97, we will have reduced program spending from $120 billion in 
1993–94 to under $108 billion. 
 
Relative to the size of our economy, program spending will be lower in 
1996–97 than at any time since 1951. 
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The budgets of government departments are being reduced dramatically, in 
several cases halved over the next three years. 
 
Figure 2 shows the sizes of the cuts to various departments’ budgets. 
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Figure 2: Changes in Federal Department Spending 1997–98 relative to 1994–95 
(Percent Change) 
 
Source:  Paul Martin speech to House of Commons, February 27, 1995, 





Martin also announced steps to privatize and commercialize various government 
enterprises.  The government sold CN, the major railway that it had owned, a 
uranium company, Cameco, that it had owned with Saskatchewan’s government, 
and a large number of its shares in Petro-Canada, a government energy company 
started by Pierre Trudeau.  By 2004, the government had sold all its shares in 
Petro-Canada.  One particular measure that paid dividends to Canadians way 
beyond the budget savings was the commercialization of the Air Navigation 
System.  By selling off the air traffic control system to a private nonprofit 
company, NAV Canada, the government netted $1.4 billion and saved $200 
million in annual subsidies.
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  A big benefit beyond this savings is that NAV 
Canada has revolutionized air traffic control in Canada, putting Canada decades 




Three things stand out from figure 1 and from the excerpt from the budget speech: 
 
1) The cuts in government spending in various departments were absolute cuts in 
dollar amounts, not just cuts in rates of growth of spending. 
 
2) There were six to seven dollars in budget cuts for every dollar of tax increases. 
 
3) Spending on programs—in other words, federal spending other than for interest 
on the debt—was lower in dollar terms, and, therefore, even lower adjusted for 
inflation, than spending in the 1993–94.  Indeed, program spending was lower as a 




In the 1995 budget and in later budgets, Martin built in conservative assumptions 
to make the probability very high that the deficit would be at or under the 
promised goals.  As he put it at the time, he wanted to achieve these goals ―come 
hell or high water.‖  Indeed, he was so known for that term during the 1990s that 
he chose Come Hell or High Water as the title of his 2008 autobiography.   So, for 
example, the consensus estimates among private-sector economists for 1999 were 
nominal GDP growth of 2.7 percent and interest rates on three-month T-bills and 
ten-year government bonds of 4.4 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively.  Martin 
assumed GDP growth of 2.5 percent, thus assuming less tax revenue than if the 
private-sector forecasts were correct.  He also assumed interest rates of 5.1 percent 
and 5.6 percent interest on three-month T-bills and ten-year government bonds, 
respectively.  If rates turned out to be lower, the amount the Canadian government 
would pay on the debt it rolled over would be lower.  As it turned out, nominal 
GDP grew by a whopping 7.4 percent that year, and three-month and ten-year 
interest rates averaged 4.8 percent and 5.8 percent respectively.  In other words, 
Martin estimated too high for short-term rates and too low for long-term rates.  
 14 
Interestingly, both of his pessimistic forecasts were closer to the actual numbers 
than the private-sector forecasts were.  Moreover, Martin also planned for a $3 
billion contingency reserve in case his forecasts proved too optimistic.  If the 
forecasts proved not too optimistic, this reserve would go toward paying down the 
debt.  
 
What’s striking is that such conservative assumptions are the opposite of the kind 
politicians usually make.  Politicians usually paint rosy scenarios so that they can 
justify higher spending than otherwise.  Clearly, Martin was a man on a debt-
reduction mission.  Martin also had what he called a ―no-deficit rule.‖  That is, 
once he had managed to get rid of the deficit, he wanted to avoid future deficits.  
As Martin explained in his memoirs: 
 
It is important to understand that the no-deficit rule was a sharp 
break with tradition.  In the postwar years, many economists argued 
that you did not need to be in the black every year, as long as 
budgets were balanced over the course of the economic cycle, so that 
deficits during slumps would be paid off with surpluses in good 
years.  Whatever the economic rationale for that approach, it didn’t 
work in the real world of politicians.  Once you break the spell—
once governments find that they can get away with borrowing 
instead of taxing to pay the bills—it is almost impossibly tempting 





What a wonderful summary of fiscal policy for most of Canada’s postwar years 
until the mid-1990s.  Keynesians would not have approved; on the other hand, 
Nobel economics laureate James Buchanan and co-author Richard Wagner would 
have.
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 They had earlier noted what Paul Martin discovered: without a balanced 
budget rule, either a formal rule or an informal norm, politicians would 
consistently run budget deficits.  
 
As it turned out, Martin’s assumptions proved overly conservative year after year, 
but especially in FY 1996–97 and FY 1997–98 (see figure 3).
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Figure 3: Federal Budgetary Balance: Targets and Outcomes  




Source: Courchene, Thomas. “Half-Way Home: Canada’s Remarkable Fiscal 
Turnaround and the Paul Martin Legacy,” although the numbers for outcomes 
differ slightly from Courchene’s numbers.  My outcome numbers are taken from 
Department of Finance, Federal Government Public Accounts at 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/frt-trf/2009/frt0901-eng.asp 
 
In FY 1996–97, Martin planned for a deficit of $24.3 billion, down from an actual 
deficit in FY 1995–96 of $37.5 billion.  The actual result for 1996-97: a deficit of 
only $8.7 billion.  Martin overachieved by $15.6 billion.  That overachievement 
alone made the federal debt 2.8 percent lower than otherwise.  For FY 1997–98, 
Martin planned for a deficit of $17 billion and the actual result was a surplus of 
$3.0 billion, the Canadian federal government’s first surplus since FY 1969–70.   
 
The result of years of cuts in government spending was that, as a percent of GDP, 
federal spending on programs fell from a high of 17.5 percent in 1992–93 to 11.3 
percent in 2000–01.  Canadian economist Thomas Courchene notes that this was 
the lowest percent ―in more than half a century.‖16  Courchene wrote further:17 
 
In terms of components of program spending, federal transfers to 
persons fell from 5.8 percent of GDP in 1992–93 to 3.6 percent in 
1999–2000, or 2.2 percentage points, while transfers to provinces 
fell by 1.4 percentage points of GDP, even with the recent 
restoration of the cash transfers for the CHST [Canadian Health and 
Social Transfer, a system of block grants from the feds to the 
provincial governments.]  And along the way, debt-servicing costs 
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have fallen as well, from 5.6 percent of GDP in fiscal 1992–93 to 4.3 
percent in 1999–2000. 
 
Paul Martin resigned as minister of finance in 2002 and then became leader of the 
Liberal Party and, therefore, prime minister in 2003, replacing Jean Chretien.  His 
tenure as prime minister lasted until 2006, when the Liberal Party lost the election.  
From the time he achieved that first budget surplus in 1997–98 until 2006, Martin 
kept up his policy of running large budget surpluses.  The result: The ratio of the 
federal government’s debt to Canada’s GDP fell from 67.0 percent in 1993, when 
Martin became minister of finance, to 32.2 percent in 2006, when he lost the job of 
prime minister.  In other words, he reduced the debt-to-GDP ratio by over 50 
percent.   
 
Opposition to the Cuts 
 
As can be imagined, there was much opposition to the budget cuts, and, not 
surprisingly, the opposition came mainly from the left part of the political 
spectrum.  At the start of Martin’s time as minister of finance, the Official 
Opposition—i.e., the party with the second-most seats in the House of 
Commons—was the Bloc Quebecois, a Quebec-based party focused almost 
entirely on getting favorable deals for Quebec.  The party with the third-most seats 
was the Reform Party, which was based in Canada’s West and was filled with 
strong believers in budget cuts.  What also helped Martin was the opposition from 
conservatives in the Canadian Taxpayers Federation and the National Citizens’ 
Coalition.
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  Both groups were pushing for even bigger spending cuts.  
 
The clear-cut left-wing party was the New Democratic Party, which favored 
socialism; however, the party won only nine of 295 seats in the 1993 election and 
so the left-wing party was not a factor.  Thus, the scene was set for a ―Nixon goes 
to China‖ kind of strategy.  Just as Nixon, representing the Republican Party, 
which was more conservative than the Democratic Party, could more easily risk 
political capital in reaching out to the Communist Chinese, so Martin and 
Chretien, representing the more-left-wing of the two major parties could more 
easily risk political capital on a budget policy that was more conservative.  Martin 
needed to worry more about conservative opposition than about left-wing 
opposition.  Given his power within his own party, therefore, he was able to 
fashion more-aggressive budget cuts than otherwise.  
 
One of the biggest causes of opposition was the cut in spending on Unemployment 
Insurance, which had been renamed Employment Insurance (EI).  In a 2001 
article,
19
 Jim Stanford, the Canadian Auto Workers Union’s economist, noted how 
deep the cuts in EI were.  Real (that is, inflation-adjusted) EI benefit payments per 
unemployed person, he wrote, ―were 40 percent lower in 1999 than in 1990.‖  
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Most of this, he noted, was due not to declining real benefits for people who were 
covered by EI, but, rather, to declining coverage.  In other words, a lower percent 
of unemployed people qualified for benefits, which, of course, was one of 
Martin’s goals.  
 
The 1997 election results were one test of the popularity of the budget cuts.  Prime 
Minister Jean Chretien, seeing that the Liberal Party was doing well in the polls, 
called an election for June 2, 1997, only three years and seven months after the 
previous election.  By law, he could have waited a full five years but sensed an 
advantage in calling the election earlier.  Chretien ran on a campaign to continue 
achieving surpluses, using half of the surplus to pay down debt and the other half 
to increase spending and cut taxes.  Although his Liberal Party lost seats, falling 
from 175 seats in a Parliament with 295 seats, it still managed to win 155 seats in 
a Parliament with 301 seats, keeping a bare majority.  [Between the two elections, 
the number of seats in Parliament had been increased by six.] The Liberal Party 
won 38.5 percent of the vote, almost double the 19.4 percent of its closest 
competitor, the Reform Party.  The Liberal Party did lose seats in the Maritime 
provinces, probably because of the EI cuts noted earlier: the Maritime provinces, 
with their high seasonal unemployment, had been disproportionately high 
beneficiaries of EI and were, therefore, disproportionately large losers from the 
cuts.  Interestingly, though, the Liberal Party kept its majority status despite the 
fact that the unemployment rate announced in May 1997, the last one announced 
before the election, was a relatively high 9.6 percent.
20
  As Nadeau et al. noted in a 
2000 article, 
21
 the Liberal Party was the first in recent Canadian history to be re-
elected despite having such a high unemployment rate.  It appears that many 
Canadians wanted the government to ―stay the course.‖   
 
So why did Paul Martin, who became prime minister in 2003, lose the 2006 
election?  It had very little to do with the budget cuts.  Although Martin had made 
political enemies with his budget cuts, the main reason his party lost the election 
was the ―Sponsorship scandal,‖ which had nothing to do with the budget cuts.  
Indeed, the Sponsorship scandal resulted from one costly government program to 
persuade French Canadians in Quebec to oppose Quebec separation.  Interestingly, 
the scandal was entirely over sweetheart deals between the federal government 
and Liberal Party supporters, not over whether the government should tax people 





The bad news, for those who like smaller government, was that Martin did raise 
taxes. Fortunately, by Martin’s count, which seems accurate, taxes were increased 
by about one dollar for every six or seven dollars of spending cuts.  Virtually all of 
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the tax increases were announced in the 1994 and 1995 budgets.  Three of the 
major tax increases in the 1994 budget included reducing the deduction for meal 
and entertainment expenses from 80 percent of the expense to 50 percent;
22
 getting 
rid of the lower small-business corporate tax rate for corporations with capital of 
$15 million or more; and eliminating the $100,000 capital-gains tax exemption 
that a taxpayer could claim cumulatively over a lifetime.  In the 1995 budget, 
Martin forbade those who earned business or professional income from choosing a 
fiscal year different from the calendar year; added information requirements to 
make it easier to tax Canadians on their offshore investments; eliminated tax 
advantages previously held by family trusts; reduced the upper limit on deductible 
contributions to Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs, the Canadian 
equivalent of a deductible IRA) from $14,500
23
 in 1995 to $13,500 for 1996 and 
1997, with the limit to be allowed to increase in steps to $15,500 in 1999;
24
 
increased the surtax on the corporate income tax rate of 38 percent (the percent 
added to the basic rate) from the previously existing three percent to four percent, 
thus raising the corporate income tax rate from 39.14 percent to 39.52 percent;
25
 
and raised the gasoline tax by 1.5 cents per liter, which is approximately 5.7 cents 
per gallon. 
 
The good news on taxes is that Martin did not raise individual income tax rates.  
When he became minister of finance, Canada had a graduated tax system with 
three tax brackets for individual income taxes: 17 percent, 26 percent, and 29 
percent. These rates are low compared to what the top half of Americans, the half 
that pays almost all U.S. federal taxes on individual income—pay because 
Canada’s federal government has a smaller role in the economy than the U.S. 
federal government has.
26
  In Canada, the provincial governments have a much 
larger role than do state governments in the United States—and the provincial 
governments have the high tax rates on individual income to prove it.   
 
Canada’s three marginal tax brackets for individual income were somewhat 
misleading for four reasons.  First, the Canadian government had surtaxes on the 
tax rates.  So, for example, the surtax rate on people in the 29-percent bracket was 
five percent, making the top marginal tax rate actually 30.45 percent.  Second, the 
Canadian government, to save money, does means testing for various federal 
benefits.  The term used for this in Canada is “clawbacks.” As I wrote in 2000, 
this is ―a wonderfully descriptive term for the gradual phase-out of government 
benefits as people rise up the income scale.‖27  Consider, for example, the Canada 
Child Tax Benefit (CCTB), a payment given to families with children.  For every 
dollar your income increases after a modest threshold (for example, $40,726 in 
―family net income‖ starting in July 2010), you lose a portion of your CCTB.  If 
you have two or more children, your implicit marginal tax rate from earning an 
additional dollar after this threshold is 4 percent.  Thus the parent’s marginal tax 
rate in this case is four percentage points higher.  When I wrote about the issue in 
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2000, the clawback added five percentage points to the marginal tax rate of 
someone in this situation. 
 
Third, although Martin did not explicitly raise tax rates, inflation did the job for 
him.  Inflation puts a bigger percent of each person’s income into a higher tax 
bracket, thus turning the interaction of inflation with the graduated (progressive) 
individual income tax system into a money machine for the federal government.  
It’s true that Pierre Trudeau had introduced indexing of tax brackets in 1974, one 
of the few good economic reforms he made.  He did this a full ten years before 
Ronald Reagan and the U.S. Congress did it with the U.S. individual income tax 
system.
28
  But, beginning in 1986, Prime Minister Mulroney’s government de-
indexed tax brackets by having them adjust only for the part of inflation in excess 
of three percent annually.
29
  Thus, if inflation were, say, 4 percent, then the tax 
brackets adjusted upward only by 1 percent.  This made the government’s tax 
revenues in real terms higher than otherwise.  
 
Fourth, in 1997, Martin and Chretien raised tax rates for the Canada Pension Plan 
from a combined 6 percent for employers and employees, in stages, to 9.9 percent 
by 2003, and it has stayed there since.  The good news is that he shifted the CPP 
away from a U.S.-style Ponzi scheme to a fund that invested in real assets.  In 
1997, the CPP fund started with just federal government bonds but is now 






By 2000, the Canadian government’s spending restraint had been so successful 
that many people,
31
 including this author,
32
 were calling for tax cuts.  Martin and 
Chretien obliged.  In 2000, they restored full indexation of tax brackets for the 
individual income tax so that inflation alone could no longer put people in higher 
brackets.  With an eye on global competition for capital, they cut the flat corporate 
income tax rate, in stages, from 28 percent
33
 to 21 percent by January 1, 2004 and 
excluded 50 percent of capital gains from taxation, up from only 25 percent.  Also 
concerned about competition for highly productive labor, Martin and Chretien 
eliminated the 5-percent surtax on high-income individuals and added a 26-percent 
bracket for the people in the lower-income portion of what had previously been 
the 29-percent bracket.  By 2010, full indexing, combined with elimination of the 
surtax and the addition of the 26-percent bracket, meant that an individual did not 
reach the 29-percent bracket until he had $127,021 of taxable income.  Also, 
Martin and Chretien raised the contribution limit for RRSPs to $14,500 for 2004, 





Lessons for the United States 
 
Throughout the whole period from 1993 until 2006, when he left office, Paul 
Martin appeared to worry very little about cuts in government spending leading to 
higher unemployment.  There are three possible explanations for this, only the first 
and third of which are mutually exclusive.  The first explanation is that Martin and 
his advisers didn’t believe in the Keynesian model, according to which cuts in 
government spending unaccompanied by tax cuts will reduce aggregate demand 
for goods and services and, thus, lead to an economic slowdown.  There is 
evidence for this explanation.  Political scientist Timothy Lewis quotes an 
unnamed senior official in Canada’s Finance Department as saying that in the 
department by the mid-1990s, the Keynesian multiplier, the sine qua non of the 
Keynesian model, was ―kind of dead.‖34 
 
The second explanation is that, because Canada’s main trading partner, the United 
States, was in an economic boom, except for the 2001 recession, Canada was, 
similarly, in an economic boom.  Because Canada is a small economy with a 
thousands-mile-long border with the United States, international trade for Canada, 
whether measured by imports or exports, is far more important for economic 
expansion than for the United States.  From 1994 to 2006, Canada’s annual 
exports ranged from a low of 33.8 percent of GDP in 1994 to a high of 45.6 
percent of GDP in 2000.  Similarly, Canada’s imports ranged from a low of 32.7 
percent of GDP in 1994 to a high of 39.8 percent of GDP in 2000.  Indeed, the 
bilateral trade between Canada and the United States is the largest between any 
two countries in the world. 
 
The third explanation is that Martin and his advisers did believe, to some extent, in 
the Keynesian model, but thought that accepting lower growth and higher 
unemployment was worth it to achieve a lower debt/GDP ratio.  As it turns out, 
low economic growth was not a problem.   From 1993 to 2006, Canada’s real 
GDP grew at an annual average of 3.36 percent, a healthy growth rate. 
 
Whatever the explanation, Americans can learn some lessons from Canada’s 
experience.  The most important thing we can learn is that it can happen here—
with a decade of fiscal discipline.  The United States is in a situation in 2010 
similar to that of Canada in 1994.  The U.S. government’s debt/GDP ratio by the 
end of 2010 will likely be 62 percent,
35
 only five percentage points below 
Canada’s 1994 ratio of 67 percent.  One advantage the United States has that 
Canada didn’t is low interest rates.  Interest rates today are much lower than when 
the Canadian government altered course.  The yield on the ten-year Treasury bond 
in late June 2010, for example, was only about 3 percent.  So, one thing the U.S. 
government could do quickly is to convert some of its shorter-term debt to ten-
year debt, paying a higher interest rate in the short run but protecting itself against 
 21 
interest rates greater than three percent over the next ten years.  Also, one political 
factor makes fiscal discipline easier: Canada is more of a welfare state than the 
United States, and yet Canada’s federal government managed to make huge cuts, 
even in ―sacred cow‖ programs such as unemployment insurance.   
 
The second big lesson is that the Keynesian argument that big cuts in government 
spending will slow an economy receives no support from Canada’s experience.  
It’s true, as noted above, that the Canadian economy was booming in part because 
the U.S. economy next door was booming.  But with a cut in federal government 
spending on programs of 4.7 percent of GDP over seven years and a cut in overall 
federal spending (program spending plus interest on the debt) of 6.1 percent of 
GDP, one would expect, according to the Keynesian model, that the Canadian 
economy would have slowed somewhat.  It didn’t.  This reinforces the lesson from 
the far more extreme U.S. experience after World War II: Between FY 1945 and 
FY 1947, federal government spending was cut by 61 percent.  This was a 27-
percentage-point drop from 41.9 percent of GDP to 14.7 percent of GDP.  Yet the 
unemployment rate over that same time rose from 1.9 percent to only 3.6 percent.  




The third lesson is that if tax increases are needed, they can be a mix of relatively 
small tax increases on any given sector or group of people.  The Canadian 
government increased taxes by limiting the equivalent of IRAs, increasing the 
gasoline tax a small amount, increasing the tax rate on the highest-income people 
by a medium amount, increasing the tax rate on corporations by a small amount, 
reducing business tax deductions for meals and entertainment, and limiting a few 
other ways of avoiding taxes.  
 
There is, however, one important political factor that would make reform more 
difficult in the United States than in Canada: the structure of the U.S. political 
system.  In Canada, once the Prime Minister has decided on the budget, the 
members of his or her Party almost always vote for it.  Moreover, under Canada’s 
Constitution, the government, meaning the ruling party, has sole power to initiate 
expenditure proposals.  Parliament’s only power on spending is to approve the 
government’s proposals in full, approve them at a reduced level, or reject them.37  
In the United States, by contrast, there are three important players or sets of 




One way to make the budget battle easier to win in the United States is for 
Congress to return to its roots.  One of the lesser-known facts about the U.S. 
Congress is that for many decades, specifically from 1789 to 1885 and then again 
from 1922 to 1931, each branch of Congress had centralized budgeting.  The U.S. 
Senate and the House of Representatives each had only one committee with 




during these two eras, the federal budget was balanced except during recessions 
and wars.  Between 1789 and 1885, he notes, the average budget deficit was only 
0.26 percent of Gross National Product (GNP), and between 1922 and 1931, there 
was an average budget surplus of 0.77 percent of GNP.  From 1886 to 1921 and 
then again from 1932 until now, the U.S. Congress had decentralized spending 
authority, with numerous committees authorized to spend.  The result?  Between 
1886 and 1921, the average budget deficit was 0.69 percent of GNP, and between 
1932 and 1989 (his article was written in the early 1990s), the average budget 
deficit was a hefty 3.61 percent of GNP. 
 
Why the difference?  Cogan explains that the decentralized budget authority 
created a ―tragedy of the commons.‖  Each committee with spending authority 
knew that if it saved money, the money would simply be spent by another 
committee.  That meant that there was little incentive for any one committee to 
rein in spending.  Centralizing budget authority, by contrast, would give that 
centralized committee an incentive to make real cuts.   
 
 
The Road Ahead 
 
While this is list is meant only to be suggestive, the federal government could cut 
federal spending by over $350 billion a year by: 
 




 Getting rid of the Department of Education and the programs it runs, saving 
over $100 billion a year. 
 Ending the Department of Agriculture’s subsidy programs, saving over 
$100 billion a year.
41
 
 Privatizing air traffic control, saving over $10 billion a year. 
 Privatizing Amtrak, saving over $2 billion a year. 
 
If, in 2026, someone writes an analysis of the U.S. government’s spending and tax 
policies of the previous 16 years, what will it say?  Will it be that the U.S. 
president and Congress turned things around and managed to reduce the debt/GDP 
ratio mainly with spending cuts and only a few tax increases, as Canada’s 
government did? 
 
We don’t know and we won’t know for years.  But what we do know is that if the 
political will is there and if the political incentives are right, the U.S. budget 
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